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Private Resolution of Public Disputes: 
Employment, Arbitration, and the 
Statutory Cause of Action 
 
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to honoring 
arbitration clauses in employment agreements. In Rent-A-Center, West, 
Inc., v. Jackson,
1
 the Court found that courts should treat arbitration 
agreements in the employment context in the same manner as arbitration 
agreements found in any commercial contract. The Rent-A-Center result 
was not surprising. In recent years, the Supreme Court has faced the 
issue of mandatory arbitration agreements numerous times and, in 
virtually every case, favored arbitration.
2
 The Court has proved willing to 
cast aside or ignore precedent in its pursuit of a pro-arbitration policy.
3
 
The Rent-A-Center case, like almost all employment claims, did not 
arise out of the employment agreement that contained the arbitration 
clause. Instead, the plaintiff, Antonio Jackson, alleged racial 
discrimination and retaliation. Jackson’s employer moved to dismiss the 
action and compel arbitration, citing the arbitration clause in Jackson’s 
employment agreement. This agreement provided for arbitration of all 
disputes arising out of Jackson’s employment with Rent-A-Center, 
including claims for discrimination.
4
 The agreement also stated that 
“[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, 
 
        *    J.D., Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma 
State University. 
1. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
2. See e.g., 14 Penn Plaza, L.L.C. v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (2009) (endorsing 
mandatory labor arbitration, instead of litigation, to resolve statutory claims of unlawful 
age-based employment discrimination brought by labor union-represented employees). 
3. See id. at 1474 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (prefacing his dissent with the comment 
that his “concern regarding the Court's subversion of precedent to the policy favoring 
arbitration prompt[ed] . . . additional remarks.”). 
4. Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2775. 
1
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shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the 
interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this 
Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of 
this Agreement is void or voidable.”5 
Jackson argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, 
rendering it unenforceable. Rent-A-Center responded that Jackson had 
agreed that the arbitrator would have exclusive authority to resolve any 
dispute about the enforceability of the agreement. Therefore, the Court 
lacked authority to hear Jackson’s unconscionability claim. In the end, 
the Supreme Court sided with Rent-A-Center. The Court found that, for a 
court to hear a claim of unconscionability where the parties have agreed 
to have an arbitrator decide all issues, a plaintiff must establish that the 
provision delegating questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator is itself 
unconscionable.
6
 
Following Rent-A-Center, it seems certain that all challenges to the 
fairness of mandatory arbitration clause terms will be decided not by 
courts, but by arbitrators. Arbitrators themselves will decide whether the 
arbitration process is flawed.
7
 After Rent-A-Center, employers may 
design their own arbitration scheme, confident that questions regarding 
the fairness of the scheme will not be heard by the courts but by the 
arbitrators. The law will now provide little oversight on employers in 
their use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements. 
These arbitration clauses will encompass not just disputes arising 
from the employment agreement, but statutory claims as well. Because 
employees have a right to the protection of public statutes, consigning 
important statutory claims to private arbitration carries huge risks. 
Society should question the wisdom of relegating almost all employment 
claims to private processes. Are public interests satisfied “when public 
laws are enforced in the private fora”?8 
In favoring arbitration clauses in employment agreements, the 
Supreme Court has relied on general contract principles.
9
 Essentially, the 
Court has found that, if an employee has agreed to have his statutory 
discrimination heard in a private forum, then that employee should stick 
 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 2780. 
7. Id. at 2778. 
8. Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of 
Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 295 (1999). 
9. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2776. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/3
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with the deal.
10
 
But relying on general contract principles to decide a matter 
involving the employment relationship is disingenuous. In fact, the 
standard employment agreement bears little relationship to the traditional 
contract. It is not the employment agreement, but statutes that furnish the 
majority of the duties and obligations of an employment relationship. 
Numerous areas of the employment relationship are constrained by 
public law and therefore not subject to contract. The typical employment 
agreement governs relatively minor areas—things like salary and 
benefits. The most important aspects of the employment relationship—
occupational safety and health, minimum wage, overtime pay, 
discrimination—exist independently and cannot be waived in contract. 
In essence, the employment relationship exists on a continuum. At 
one end of the spectrum lie those areas that are solely governed by 
contract. At the other end of the spectrum lie those rights that are granted 
by statute. How should society construe the ability of employer and 
employee to choose an alternative forum? Is it a matter of contract? Or is 
a judicial forum a right that is neither waivable nor modifiable? 
We know that the current judicial consensus favors the contractual 
approach, treating arbitration agreements as if they were governed solely 
by contract principles. In contrast, many people argue that mandatory 
arbitration agreements should be placed outside the scope of contract and 
banned outright.
11
 Therefore, society faces a difficult choice. It must ask 
itself whether the benefit of permitting parties to choose an alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism outweighs the burden placed on society by 
the possibility that the choice may render public law meaningless. 
In this Article, I argue that one option doesn’t have to exist to the 
exclusion of the other. I believe that arbitration agreements fall 
somewhere along the middle of the rights/contract continuum. My 
understanding of the nature of arbitration agreements relies on a 
previously existing area of employment law. 
There is a particular aspect of the employment relationship that, 
while open to contract, remains subject to constraints imposed by the 
 
10. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) 
(explaining that parties should be held to their agreements to arbitrate). 
11. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham & David Henning Good, A Better Solution to 
Moral Hazard in Employment Arbitration: It Is Time to Ban Predispute Binding 
Arbitration Clauses, 93 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1905680. 
3
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law. A noncompete agreement permits an employee to contract with his 
employer to not work for a competitor following the termination of the 
employment relationship. This right to contract away the right to 
compete is, however, narrowly construed by the court system. A court 
may not enforce a noncompete agreement unless the agreement meets a 
standard of reasonableness. I propose that this same analysis be applied 
to arbitration agreements. It is my position that a predispute, mandatory 
arbitration agreement should not be enforced unless it meets certain 
requirements that together make the agreement reasonable. This standard 
of reasonableness will protect the interests of all parties: the employer, 
the employee, and society as a whole. 
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the problems created by the use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements. Part III 
examines the fallacy behind applying general contract principles to 
arbitration agreements in the employment context. In Part IV, I outline a 
proposal to constrain the use of mandatory arbitration as a means of 
resolving employment disputes. My proposed legislative solution is 
designed to address the concerns raised by the continued use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements. 
 
II.  There Is a Problem with Arbitration Clauses in Employment 
Agreements 
 
A.  The Employment Relationship and Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements Are in Conflict 
 
A tension exists between mandatory arbitration agreements and 
employment relationships. This tension results from the nature of the 
disputes heard in arbitration. In an ordinary commercial arbitration 
proceeding, the issues addressed stem from the contract itself. The terms 
of the contract give rise to the claims and defenses to be heard by the 
arbitrator. In the arbitration of employment disputes, it is more likely that 
the dispute stems from an alleged violation of a statutory right. In an 
employment arbitration, the claims and defenses derive from rights 
granted by either statute or the common law. 
Through the years, courts have acknowledged the different nature of 
employment arbitration and often struggled with the issue. When first 
faced with the question of arbitration of statutory employment rights, the 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/3
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Supreme Court found that an employee’s agreement to arbitrate contract 
claims did not waive any rights to pursue statutory claims in court.
12
 
Later, the Court would reverse direction and permit employees to agree 
to arbitrate statutory claims.
13
 
Arbitration, even commercial arbitration, had a long road to 
legitimacy. Prior to passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the 
“Act”) in 1925, the judicial system was hostile to arbitration.14 The idea 
of a privatized court system seemed wrong—how could a judicial system 
work if the parties were able to contract their way out of it?
15
 In an effort 
to combat judges’ hostility to arbitration agreements and the resulting 
privatization of disputes, Congress created a statutory scheme designed 
to overcome judicial resistance to arbitration.
16
 The FAA required courts 
to enforce arbitration agreements—to compel parties to arbitration when 
an arbitration agreement existed, and to enforce arbitral awards. The 
FAA was the first step to a national policy favoring arbitration.
17
 The 
FAA’s success is evident as mandatory arbitration has gone from pariah 
to favored status. 
The drafters of the FAA intended the legislation to put arbitration 
agreements on the same footing as other contracts.
18
 To that end, section 
2 of the FAA, the “primary substantive provision of the Act,”19 states 
that arbitration agreements in contracts involving commerce are “valid, 
 
12. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
13. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). For the purposes of 
this Article, these three cases, as a unit, are referred to as the Mitsubishi Trilogy. For a 
discussion of the Mitsubishi Trilogy, see infra Part II.B. 
14. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974). See also Stephen 
K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 516 (2009). 
15. Many regarded the mandatory arbitration agreement as an attempt to avoid the 
jurisdiction of the court. See John E. Taylor, Note, Helping Those Who Help Themselves: 
The Fourth Circuit's Treatment of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment 
Discrimination Claims in Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc. and EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 79 N.C. L. REV. 239 (2000). See also Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled 
Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates And 
The Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 600 (2009). 
16. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
17. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008) (citing Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)). 
18. Marcantel, supra note 15, at 602. 
19. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
5
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irrevocable, and enforceable.”20 Section 2 further requires courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,
21
 “save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”22 The FAA provides that petitions to compel arbitration may 
be brought before “any United States district court which, save for such 
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28 . . . of the subject 
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties.”23 
The FAA also made suitable provisions for judicial enforcement of 
arbitral awards. The FAA permits a party to seek enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in federal court.
24
 The Act provided a method for 
prevailing parties to file a motion for confirmation of the award by a 
federal court, and an opportunity for judicial review to confirm, vacate, 
or modify arbitration awards.
25
 The FAA forms, for the most part, a 
single federal law of arbitration and preempts state arbitration laws to the 
extent those laws conflict with the FAA.
26
 
 
B.  Judicial Treatment of Arbitration in Employment Has 
Changed 
 
Arbitration in the employment context has a confused history. The 
FAA did not mention employment arbitration or employment 
 
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
21. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 478 (1989). 
22. § 2. 
23. § 4. 
24. Id. Specifically, the statute holds: 
 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another 
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any 
United States district court which, save for such agreement, would 
have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of 
the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the 
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the 
manner provided for in such agreement. 
 
Id. 
25. §§ 9-11. 
26. See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (holding 
that while states may “regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general 
contract law principles,” section 2 of the FAA preempts state law from placing the 
arbitration clauses on “unequal footing” with other terms in the agreement). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/3
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agreements. The Supreme Court first addressed the question of 
employment arbitration in a case involving collective bargaining. In 
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, the 
Supreme Court decided that federal courts could enforce arbitration 
clauses contained in collective bargaining agreements.
27
 The Lincoln 
Mills Court, however, did not rely on the FAA. Instead, the Court 
permitted arbitration of employment disputes, at least in the collective 
bargaining sense, based on language found in the Labor-Management 
Relations Act of 1947.
28
 The Court found that arbitration of legal 
disputes was an integral component of the negotiation process, and that a 
court should have little to say in the context of a negotiated agreement 
between union and management. The Lincoln Mills decision left open the 
question as to what courts would say about the use of mandatory 
arbitration agreements in non-union employment relationships. 
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII, which prohibited employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin.
29
 Later federal statutes extended legal protection to age,
30
 
pregnancy,
31
 and disability.
32
 These employment rights were gained not 
through the collective bargaining process, but instead through statute. 
The statutes also granted to employees, as well as prospective 
employees, statutory causes of action. Title VII freed employees, at least 
in some small part, from some of the constrictions of the employment-at-
will doctrine, which provides that employers may lawfully “dismiss their 
employees at will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause 
morally wrong.”33 Passage of antidiscrimination legislation gave 
employees a weapon—providing them with the ability to sue their 
employers and have their complaints heard in federal court. 
Around this time, state courts also began to test the limits of the 
employment-at-will doctrine. This recognition of employee rights, 
whether gained through statute or judicial decision, resulted in an 
increase in employment litigation.
34
 Employers, feeling threatened by the 
 
27. 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957). 
28. Id. 
29. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
30. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(2006). 
31. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
32. See Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). 
33. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). 
34. Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 
7
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court system’s willingness to side with employees, attempted to 
minimize their exposure to adverse verdicts. Many employers, seeking to 
evade the judicial system, began to include mandatory arbitration clauses 
in their employment agreements. These clauses typically required 
arbitration of all workplace disputes, including those arising out of 
statutory claims. 
The insertion of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment 
agreements was controversial. Courts expressed their skepticism of the 
arbitration process and the attempts by employers to avoid jurisdiction. 
In the first test of the arbitration clause in a non-union employment 
agreement, the Supreme Court found that agreement to a mandatory 
arbitration process could not prevent a plaintiff from asserting statutory 
rights. 
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
35
 an employee brought a 
statutory discrimination claim in federal court, following arbitration of a 
contract claim. The same facts underlay both the statutory and contract 
claims. The Court held that an arbitration of the contract claim did not 
prevent subsequent litigation of the employee’s statutory discrimination 
claim. The Court refused to accept the employer’s argument that the 
petitioner waived his cause of action under Title VII, making it clear that 
“there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title 
VII.”36 The Court went on to note, “waiver of these rights would defeat 
the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.”37 
More importantly, by agreeing to arbitration of contract rights, a 
party does not waive right to a judicial forum to hear statutory claims. 
“[M]ere resort to the arbitral forum to enforce contractual rights 
constitutes no such waiver.”38 The Alexander Court expressed its belief 
that an arbitration proceeding did not provide a substitute forum for the 
resolution of statutory employment claims. The Court distrusted the 
arbitration process to handle such weighty issues, citing “the informality 
of arbitral procedures, the lack of labor arbitrators’ expertise on issues of 
substantive law, and the absence of written opinions.”39 
The Alexander Court recognized that an employee making a claim 
 
BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 419 (2006) [hereinafter Bales, Employment Arbitration]. 
35. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
36. Id. at 51. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 52. 
39. See id. at 56-58. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/3
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under Title VII asserted a statutory right separate from the contract. An 
arbitrator lacked the power to hear statutory claims. As the Court stated: 
 
If an arbitral decision is based “solely upon the 
arbitrator’s view of the requirements of enacted 
legislation,” rather than on an interpretation of the 
collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has 
“exceeded the scope of the submission,” and the award 
will not be enforced. . . . [T]he arbitrator has authority to 
resolve only questions of contractual rights, and this 
authority remains regardless of whether certain 
contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the 
substantive rights secured by Title VII.
40
 
 
The Court would, however, lose its distrust of arbitration schemes to deal 
with statutory disputes, as the Supreme Court changed its initial negative 
view. In three cases, the Court “reversed a longstanding presumption that 
employment claims were exempt from the FAA.”41 In these cases, 
referred to now as the Mitsubishi Trilogy,
42
 the Court enforced arbitration 
agreements that extended to the following statutory claims: antitrust, 
securities, and racketeering laws. The Court stated, “we are well past the 
time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the 
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration 
as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”43 The Mitsubishi Trilogy 
signaled the Court’s altered view of the arbitration process. 
Even after Mitsubishi, however, an important question remained—
whether the rights granted under Title VII and similar anti-discrimination 
statutes could be consigned to arbitration. The Court seemed to answer 
that question in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
44
 There the 
Court found that a mandatory arbitration agreement, executed at the 
commencement of employment, bound a nonunion financial services 
 
40. Id. at 53-54 (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). 
41. Kenneth F. Dunham, Great Gilmer’s Ghost: The Haunting Tale of the Role of 
Employment Arbitration in the Disappearance of Statutory Rights in Discrimination 
Cases, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 303, 307 (2005). 
42. See cases cited supra note 13. 
43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-
27 (1985). 
44. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
9
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worker. The Court held that the plaintiff could not litigate in court his 
allegation that he was terminated for unlawful age discrimination in 
violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967.
45
 
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court found that the FAA permitted an 
employer to require a non-union employee to arbitrate, rather than 
litigate, a federal age discrimination claim.
46
 In doing so, the employee 
was not waiving any substantive rights. “By agreeing to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by 
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”47 According to the Court, objections of 
unconscionability and procedural unfairness could be addressed on a 
case-by-case basis. The Court decided that employment arbitration 
agreements would be enforced absent “the sort of fraud or overwhelming 
economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any 
contract.”48 
Despite the Gilmer decision, at least some doubt remained regarding 
the applicability of the FAA to employment agreements. The arbitration 
agreement in Gilmer was not part of an employment agreement.
49
 The 
FAA specifically excludes from the Act’s coverage “contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”50 Therefore, the 
argument existed that the text of the FAA itself precluded the application 
of the statute to arbitration clauses found in employment agreements. 
Given the traditional broad interpretation of “interstate commerce,”51 
 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 26. 
47. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. 
48. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
49. Id. at 23. 
50. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See also Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to 
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1345 (1997) (noting 
that since the arbitration agreement in Gilmer “was part of a registration process with the 
New York Stock Exchange, rather than a contract of employment directly between 
Gilmer and his former employer, the Court was able to avoid construing the reach of the 
exclusion in § 1 of the FAA.”). 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair 
Labor Standards Act). In that case, the Court elaborated: 
 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to 
the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/3
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most employees would presumably be excluded from the Act’s coverage. 
The Supreme Court confronted this issue in Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams
52
 and found that the FAA’s proscription of the Act’s 
application should be read narrowly. In Circuit City, the plaintiff signed 
an employment agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause.
53
 
When an employment dispute arose, the trial court compelled 
arbitration.
54
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
overturned, finding that the text of the FAA excluded most employment 
disputes.
55
 The Supreme Court disagreed. 
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court held that the exemption in the 
FAA concerned only employment contracts of seamen, railroad 
employees, and those “actually engaged in the movement of goods in 
interstate commerce.”56 This interpretation indicated that the limiting text 
of the FAA was directed only to transportation workers.
57
 For all other 
employees, claims arising out of statutory violations could be consigned 
to arbitration.
58
 The Court reasoned that any other interpretation would 
make the exemption superfluous.
59
 Following Circuit City, employers 
could routinely include arbitration clauses in employment agreements, 
subject only to general contract defenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the 
exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of 
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the 
exercise of the granted power of Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce.  
 
Id. at 118 (emphasis added) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); United 
States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199 (1919)). 
52. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
53. Id. at 110. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 112 (quoting Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. Id. at 109 (the Court clearly stated that they “decide[d] that the better 
interpretation is to construe the statute, as most of the Courts of Appeals have done, to 
confine the exemption to transportation workers.”). 
58. See id. at 109, 113. 
59. Id. at 113. 
11
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C.  The Potential for Abuse Requires Oversight of Arbitration in 
Employment 
 
Given the Supreme Court’s continued support of the concept, and 
the perceived advantages of arbitration, one may question why 
mandatory arbitration in the employment context is problematic. After 
all, employees can always refuse to agree to the mandatory arbitration 
clauses. Moreover, in a perfect world, employees could negotiate the 
scope and applicability of the clause. Employees retain their right to 
general contract defenses—most importantly the defense of 
unconscionability. Why then should we as a society exhibit concern 
about employment arbitration? 
In fact, a number of policy reasons justify the limited use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in the employment agreements. First, the 
decision to arbitrate employment disputes is often made on a unilateral 
basis. No opportunity exists for employees to provide input regarding the 
functioning of the arbitration process. Instead, employers create 
arbitration systems “with no employee input, often in secret, and then 
spring the procedure on employees.”60 Often, employees are not provided 
with guidance on arbitration—either the concept or the actual 
procedure.
61
 Employees are likely unfamiliar with the judicial process 
and are therefore uncertain as to the meaning of selecting arbitration as 
the final means of dispute resolution.
62
 Because of this lack of 
knowledge, the employee “is in no position to bargain or shop for a 
better term . . . .”63 
Agreement to any arbitration proceeding should be knowing and 
voluntary.
64
 Voluntariness, however, likely means something different in 
the employment context than in a commercial setting. Some courts have 
noted that agreements to employment arbitration may often be 
considered involuntary, because arbitration clauses are included in 
 
60. Martha Halvordson, Employment Arbitration: A Closer Look, 64 J. MO. B. 174, 
174 (2008). 
61. Id. 
62. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 
57 (1997). 
63. Id. 
64. See e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986); 
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985); Nat’l Equip. Rental, 
Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/3
PIVATEAU_Formatted_Finalv3 4/11/2012  7:40 PM 
126 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
standard form employment agreements.
65
 Employees are presented with 
the agreement on “a take it or leave it, and be fired/not hired, basis.”66 
“Employees ‘must either “‘agree’” to waive their right to litigate and use 
the . . . arbitration procedure or lose their jobs.’”67 
Compulsory arbitration may not be compatible with the public 
polices at stake in employment. Anti-discrimination laws safeguard the 
rights of employees to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, age, and disability. These rights are not negotiable. Although 
employees may decide to ignore violations of the law or they may settle 
their differences privately, they may not contractually waive such 
rights.
68
 The law provides public schemes, both through administrative 
procedures and litigation, for enforcement.
69
 Legislation provides an 
entire schedule of remedies.
70
 
Finally, there is a question as to whether private arbitration schemes 
are equipped to deal with statutory discrimination claims. Employment 
discrimination remains a problem; laws aimed at eliminating 
employment discrimination have not solved America’s discrimination 
problems. White women and minorities of both sexes remain not only 
behind white males, “but have regressed recently in wages, 
representation in management, and representation in jobs in line for 
promotion to management.”71 While equal opportunity in employment 
 
65. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of 
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (1997). 
66. Christina Semmer, The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard: Is the Sixth 
Circuit’s Test Enough to Level the Playing Field in Mandatory Employment Arbitration?, 
2 J. DISP. RESOL. 607, 613 (2008). 
67. See Halvordson, supra note 60, at 174. 
68. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (stating that the 
Court believes that “it is clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s 
rights under Title VII.”). See also Enforcement Guidance on Non-Waivable Employee 
Rights under Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Enforced Statutes, 
EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/waiver. 
html. 
69. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
70. See generally id. 
71. Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal 
Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 193, 194 (2009). Interestingly, McCormick goes on to note the following facts 
from the statistics: 
 
Black women . . . earn sixty-three percent of what white men earn, 
and Latina women earn only fifty-two percent of what white men 
13
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may have improved since passage of Title VII, underlying problems 
remain and the statistics are clear. These statistics cannot be explained 
simply by facially neutral factors.
72
 
Whatever the cause of the continued lag in employment statistics, 
whether the problem lies with the statute or its enforcement model,
73
 
mandatory private arbitration, as it is currently practiced, is not the 
answer. The process of shunting employment discrimination claims off 
to private arbitration panels—with non-standardized procedures, 
questions of fairness, questions of due process, and a lack of 
transparency—seems certain to perpetuate the problem of employment 
discrimination. 
 
III.  The Supreme Court Erred in Relying on Contract Principles 
 
A.  The Employment Relationship Is Complex 
 
The employment relationship represents “one of the most complex 
and important relationships in modern society.”74 The employment 
relationship, like the employment agreement that memorializes it, is 
almost inherently asymmetrical. The agreement is not the result of a 
bargain struck between equals.
75
 The majority of employees are not able 
to change any terms of the employment agreement, including the 
arbitration clause.
76
 The employer need not pay any additional 
consideration for the arbitration agreement; courts routinely construe 
 
earn. . . . Additionally, the number of women of all colors in 
corporate officer posts and in the pipeline for those posts at Fortune 
500 companies has fallen in the past two years. Women of color 
make up just two percent of those corporate officer posts. 
 
Id. 
72. See id. 194-95. 
73. See id. at 194-96. The continuing problem may actually be a result of 
ineffectual enforcement by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
Perhaps, as some claim, the problem lies squarely with the ability of the EEOC to create 
accountability on the part of those making employment decisions. McCormick sums up 
this frustration, stating, “The current model, with the EEOC writing compliance 
guidelines, encouraging mediation and occasionally acting as prosecutor, is not working.” 
Id. at 195. 
74. Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 
29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 351 (2008). 
75. Id. at 379. 
76. Id. at 379-80. 
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continued employment as adequate consideration.
77
 Employers have sole 
control of all documents, agreements, policies and other terms of the 
employment relationship.
78
 
In a commercial contract, the parties agree to arbitrate disputes 
arising out of the subject matter of the contract. The contract will contain 
the rights and obligations of the parties, and the arbitration agreement 
provides the forum that will adjudicate disputes related to those rights 
and obligations.
79
 The employment agreement is different. In the 
employment agreement, the arbitration clause is “immaterial to the core 
of the transaction.”80 While the employment agreement may contain 
provisions regarding salary and benefits, the employer has likely not 
insisted on a mandatory arbitration agreement to resolve disputes about 
salary and benefits. Instead, the employer intends to obtain the 
employee’s consent to submit future statutory claims to an arbitration 
proceeding. 
At one time, courts viewed the employment relationship as a matter 
of contract—a “private economic relationship.”81 The modern 
employment agreement is, however, a contract only in the broadest sense 
of the word. The employment agreement may contain terms and 
conditions of employment, but those terms and conditions are subject to, 
and constrained by, external law. The rights and duties of the parties to 
the employment agreement are much more likely to be defined by 
statute, or by the common law, than by the employment agreement.
82
 
For instance, Title VII and similar antidiscrimination statutes 
impose severe limitations on employers, not only in the making of 
employment agreements, but in all aspects of employment and 
 
77. See, e.g., Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So.2d 592, 596 (Ala. 1998) (explaining 
that “an employer’s providing continued at-will employment is sufficient consideration to 
make an employee’s promise to his employer binding.”). See also Mattison v. Johnston, 
730 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that nationally, courts have found that 
“the continuation of employment for a substantial period of time . . . establishes 
consideration for a restrictive covenant.”). 
78. See Fineman, supra note 74, at 380. 
79. See e.g., JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS. INC., JAMS CLAUSE 
WORKBOOK: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES FOR COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS (2011), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAM 
S-Rules/JAMS-ADR-Clauses.pdf. 
80. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 56. 
81. McCormick, supra note 71, at 197. 
82. Id. 
15
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employment decisions.
83
 But discrimination laws are only one aspect of 
the extensive regulation of employment by legislation; there are 
numerous other examples of state control over the employment 
relationship. Hours and wages, two of the key elements of any 
employment relationship, are restricted by statute. An employee may not 
contract to work for less than the minimum wage, or agree to work 
overtime without the statutorily mandated pay addendum.
84
 The workers’ 
compensation scheme prohibits negligence suits against one’s 
employer.
85
 Occupational health and safety is a matter of government 
regulation, not of individual contractual choice.
86
 Social security and 
federal income tax withholding are matters governed by statute, not by 
contract.
87
 The time and manner of wage payments is subject to state 
law, not contract.
88
 
 
B.  The Public Nature of Employment Law Creates Tension with 
Private Arbitration 
 
To a large extent, “employment law consists of the competing 
paradigms of rights and contract.”89 In any employment dispute, conflicts 
are likely to arise between the aspects of employment that are governed 
by contract and those governed by public law. The employment 
relationship is, in one sense, based in contract: an individual agrees to 
work for an employer, and certain terms of that work, e.g., salary or 
benefits, will be dictated by the agreement, whether implicit or express.
90
 
But the contract relationship occurs within boundaries. Numerous 
external laws limit the contract relationship. These external laws 
acknowledge rights and grant entitlements. These laws limiting contract 
 
83. Id. 
84. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (2006). 
85. See e.g., Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act “provides the exclusive remedy for injuries 
sustained by an employee in the course of his employment as a result of his employer’s 
negligence”). 
86. See Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
700 (2006). 
87. See, e.g., RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
88. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 207 (Deering 2011). 
89. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and 
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 
380 (2006). 
90. Id. 
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rights within the employment relationship are present for public policy 
purposes, designed to serve the public interest and values.
91
 
In Gilmer, the Court noted that the purpose of the FAA “was to 
place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts.”92 In 
favoring arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court relied on general 
contract principles, i.e., because the parties made an agreement to 
arbitrate, they “should be held to it.”93 According to this reasoning, 
parties must arbitrate their employment-related claims because they 
agreed to arbitrate their claims. 
But citing traditional contract principles to support arbitration is 
disingenuous. As we have seen, the modern employment agreement is 
only tangentially related to traditional notions of contract. Numerous 
state and federal statutes, as well as the common law, constrain the 
employment agreement. While courts may still view employment as a 
contractual relationship, the ability of the parties to contract is severely 
constricted. 
Employment disputes are, to a large part, public conflicts.
94
 The 
interests involved in the typical employment arbitration claim are the 
interests of society. The law decrees that employees belonging to certain 
protected classes may be free of discrimination in conjunction with their 
employment. The law provides remedies for those who have been 
discriminated against. It is the public who created and defined the rights 
of the parties to the employment. Society dictated which activities give 
rise to the claim, and society dictated the appropriate remedy given to the 
injured. 
In contrast, the disputes arising out of commercial contracts concern 
only the interests of the parties involved in the contract. A public court 
may eventually hear the dispute, but the important issues at stake are 
those issues set forth in the contract. The scope of the conflict, the basis 
for the claim, and perhaps even the remedies themselves are provided by 
the contract. The parties to a contract create their rights. Such rights are 
subject to waiver or modification by the parties themselves. The claims 
between the parties are private, not public.
95
 
 
91. Id. 
92. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). 
93. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94. See generally Edwards, supra note 8, at 294. 
95. Id. 
17
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At seen herein, the employment-at-will doctrine has boundaries. 
The employment relationship is a hybrid entity. Current employment law 
is dictated as much by statute as it is by the terms of the employment 
agreement. Overlaying the employment-at-will doctrine with statutorily 
mandated rights created a system that is based in both contract and 
rights. 
 
IV.  The Employment Arbitration Agreement Should Be Limited 
 
A.  The Law Already Limits the Terms of an Arbitration 
Agreement 
 
I propose that the ability of the parties to enter into an arbitration 
agreement be limited. This is not a revolutionary position. Limiting the 
ability of the parties to contract to arbitration terms has already occurred. 
Arbitration terms are currently constrained in three ways: by the 
language of the FAA, state contract law, and the statute underlying the 
dispute. 
First, the FAA itself limits the effect of the arbitration agreement. 
While the FAA expressly states that arbitration agreements “shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” the Act permits courts to modify or 
vacate arbitration awards. Sections 10 and 11 provide the grounds for 
vacatur and modification. 
Section 10 of the Act permits a court to vacate an arbitration award 
under certain conditions: 
 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, 
or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or 
corruption by the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where 
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in 
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of another misbehavior by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where 
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award 
upon the subject matter was not made.
96
 
 
96. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). 
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Under section 11, the grounds for modifying or correcting an award 
include “evident material miscalculation,” “evident material mistake,” 
and “imperfect[ions] in [a] matter of form not affecting the merits . . . .”97 
Together these provisions protect the parties and provide base line 
requirements of fairness.
98
 
The FAA also permits arbitration agreements to be challenged upon 
any basis that would permit a contract to be challenged. The Act 
preserves the right of the parties to challenge the arbitration agreement 
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”99 Thus, parties may still bring claims based on any ground that 
would allow a party to challenge a contract.
100
 
Finally, the underlying statute may (at least indirectly) limit the 
rights of parties to agree to arbitration terms. The Supreme Court has 
indicated that arbitration terms must meet a certain standard of fairness. 
In Gilmer, the Court held that a valid arbitration agreement must permit 
the plaintiff to “effectively . . . vindicate” his substantive statutory 
rights.
101
 While precise definition is not possible, “effective vindication” 
would seem to mean that the arbitration process must maintain the same 
rights and remedies that substantive law would provide to the plaintiff.
102
 
The parties may waive the forum in which to hear the dispute; they may 
not waive the substantive law applying to the dispute.
103
 
In these three important ways, the law already constrains arbitration 
agreements. Therefore, the limitations that I propose herein are 
consistent with pre-existing laws. My proposal is not about altering 
fundamental notions of freedom of contract. As shown, employers are 
already constrained in their right to contract regarding arbitration. All I 
suggest is altering the extent to which the law will restrain the parties. 
 
97. § 11(a), (c). 
98. See § 10(a) (containing the grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards). 
99. § 2. 
100. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It 
Looks, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 783, 801 (2008) (explaining that “unconscionability” is 
a difficult concept for the purposes of the statute, however, as it provides little guidance 
for courts). Antoine notes that while courts have often addressed unconscionability, their 
decisions have been “widely diverse.” Id. 
101. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
102. Id. at 26. 
103. Id. 
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B.  A Place Exists for Mandatory Arbitration 
 
While I argue for constraint, I do not suggest that arbitration 
agreements be banned outright. Others would disagree. Many have 
proposed the absolute elimination of predispute, mandatory arbitration in 
the employment context.
104
 
 
[Banning arbitration] rescues public law that has been 
put at risk by the unchecked growth of mandatory 
arbitration. It regulates the “wild west” processes 
creative counsel are designing to manage risk on behalf 
of their clients. It brings us back from almost two 
decades of a laissez faire, failed approach to balancing 
the great value of binding arbitration with the potential 
for its abuse in the hands of the economically 
powerful.
105
 
 
Nor is the movement to prohibit arbitration agreements in the 
employment relationship merely academic. The proposed federal 
Arbitration Fairness Act, which first surfaced in 2007, was defeated, and 
revisited again in 2009, prohibited most predispute arbitration 
agreements between companies and individuals.
106
 The proposed statute 
was sweeping, prohibiting the use of arbitration agreements in 
“employment, consumer or franchise disputes as well as disputes arising 
under statutes intended to protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or 
transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power.”107 In such 
matters, the parties would be limited to postdispute arbitration 
agreements. 
Broad proposals that would eliminate all mandatory arbitration 
agreements are not the solution.
108
 There is no need to ignore the 
 
104. See, e.g., Bingham & David, supra note 11. 
105. Id. at 2-3. 
106. For the original text of the document, see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 
1782, 110th Cong. (2007). 
107. Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 268-69 (2008). 
108. See id. As discussed by Rutledge, the proposed legislation would invalidate 
arbitration in many contexts, including presumably disputes in the securities industry. 
The new law would apply not only prospectively, to end the use of such agreements 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/3
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potential benefits of arbitration. Arbitration has its advantages. 
Arbitration is meant to remedy a system weighed down with cost and 
delay, and it may lead to the resolution of claims at lower cost and with 
greater speed. Some estimate that litigating a typical employment case 
can range from five thousand dollars to more than two hundred thousand 
dollars, while the average cost of arbitrating an employment dispute is 
twenty thousand dollars, including attorneys’ fees. Others have suggested 
that litigation is an unlikely choice for employees making less than sixty 
thousand dollars per year.
109
 “It will cost a lawyer far less time and effort 
to take a case to arbitration; at worst, claimants can represent themselves 
or be represented by laypersons in a less formal and intimidating 
forum.”110 
Perhaps a more compelling case is the matter of time. Employees 
who bring a claim must also anticipate delays in having a case heard. The 
employee must often first pursue an administrative remedy before filing 
suit.
111
 Administrative agencies and the court system both struggle to 
 
following its enactment, but also to “any dispute or claim that arises on or after” the 
enactment date. Id. at 269. Presumably arbitration agreements that have been in place for 
years, and may have been fairly negotiated, would be rendered unenforceable by the bill. 
109. St. Antoine, supra note 100, at 791. 
110. Id. at 792. 
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). More precisely, the statute requires that 
claims made under this law:  
 
[S]hall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged 
unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge 
(including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful 
employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom 
such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case 
of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person 
aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local 
agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to 
institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving 
notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person 
aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving 
notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings 
under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such 
charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local 
agency. 
 
Id. See also Rallins v. Ohio State Univ., 191 F Supp 2d 920 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (finding 
that a gender discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 failed 
because the plaintiff did not file the allegations with the EEOC in accordance with the 
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). 
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hear claims. A case that goes to trial will take a minimum of several 
months to resolve, and is likely to go on for years if appealed. An 
arbitration proceeding is likely to take much less time.
112
 Arbitration also 
guarantees that employees will have their complaint heard. An employee 
who brings his claim in court may be surprised to find that his complaint 
did not survive the procedural minefield that exists before a claim may 
reach trial. 
The private nature of the arbitration forum might appeal to 
employees as well as employers. Potential plaintiffs may see some 
comfort in the privacy protections of the arbitration process.
 
An 
employee reluctant to air his grievances in public may prefer a forum that 
provides protection from public embarrassment.
113
 
In short, arbitration of employment disputes should continue as a 
supplemental scheme for the resolution of employment disputes, 
including those that arise under statutory law. “It is an alternative that 
offers the promise of a less expensive, more expeditious, less draining 
and divisive process, and yet still effective remedy.”114 As will be 
discussed in greater detail below, it is possible to create an arbitration 
process that preserves the benefits of arbitration, while proving mindful 
of the public policies underlying statutory employment law. 
 
C.  Contract Rights in Employment Can Be Restricted 
 
We must develop the means to constrain arbitration agreements in a 
way that permits the continued use of such agreements, while at the same 
time addressing potential problems. Rather than eliminating predispute 
arbitration agreements, I propose that the ability of the parties to enter 
into arbitration agreements be constrained. The law would continue to 
permit employers to insist on arbitration agreements, but only subject to 
certain limitations. 
These reforms must take place on the federal level. It is clear from 
recent precedent that the Supreme Court is “enamored with 
arbitration”115 and is unlikely to tolerate any judicial or state restriction 
 
112. Halvordson, supra note 60, at 178. 
113. See Rutledge, supra note 107, at 267-77. 
114. Estreicher, supra note 50, at 1349. 
115. Richard A. Bales, How Can Congress Make a More Equitable Federal 
Arbitration Act, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2009) [hereinafter Bales, Federal 
Arbitration]. 
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on the use of arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court has consistently 
ruled that the FAA preempts state laws that are aimed at arbitration 
agreements.
116
 State legislatures may not act in a way that limits or 
otherwise restrain agreements to arbitrate. Federal courts have routinely 
construed the FAA so as to prevent encroachment by state law.
117
 Putting 
any sort of constraints on arbitration agreements will therefore require 
Congress to act. Without Congressional action, there is simply no way to 
change the law of arbitration. 
Fortunately, precedent exists for how the law could restrain 
contractual rights to enter into an arbitration agreement. Arbitration 
agreements could be viewed in a similar manner to another type of clause 
often found in employment agreements. The covenant not to compete, 
known more familiarly as the noncompete agreement, inhabits a shadow 
area in the employment relationship—a middle ground between areas 
governed by contract terms and those areas subject to rights granted by 
the law.
118
 
A noncompete agreement is “an agreement, generally part of a 
contract of employment or a contract to sell a business, in which the 
covenantor agrees for a specific period of time and within a particular 
area to refrain from competition with the covenantee.”119 The 
noncompete agreement is known by other names, most notably as a 
“covenant not-to-compete,” a “restrictive covenant,” or a “non-compete 
clause.”120 These terms are interchangeable and all refer to an 
employment contract or provision purporting to limit an employee’s 
power upon leaving his or her employment, to compete in the market in 
which the former employer does business.
121
 
Like arbitration agreements, noncompete agreements are not meant 
to punish the employee.
122
 Instead, they are meant to protect the 
 
116. Id.; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
117. Bales, Federal Arbitration, supra note 115, at 1085. See also Doctor’s Assocs. 
v. Cassorotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (explaining that “Congress precluded states from 
singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status.”). 
118. See generally Estlund, supra note 89. 
119. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 364 (6th ed. 1990). 
120. As no substantive difference exists among the names, this Article refers to 
such covenants as “noncompete agreements.” 
121. Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 909 n.1 (W. Va. 
1982). 
122. See Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1993). 
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employer from unfair competition.
123
 Noncompete agreements arguably 
protect an employer’s customer base, trade secrets, and other information 
vital to its success. From this perspective, noncompete agreements 
encourage employers to invest in their employees. An employer does not 
wish to invest in an employee only to see the employee take the skills 
acquired, or the company’s customers, to another employer. Logically, 
the employer will invest more in the employee if measures are in place to 
guard against the employee’s movement to a competitor. 
As with arbitration agreements, courts traditionally viewed 
noncompete agreements with disfavor, believing that the agreements 
contravened public policy.
124
 In time, just as with arbitration agreements, 
courts grew more accepting of the agreement.
125
 Nevertheless, the court 
system did not embrace the noncompete agreement with the same fervor 
as it has attached to the mandatory arbitration agreement. Instead, the 
law continues to restrict the use of noncompete agreements for any 
purpose other than for legitimate business purposes.
126
 To ensure the 
purpose is legitimate, the law requires that a valid noncompete 
agreement meet a reasonableness requirement.
127
 
The noncompete agreement is an example of an agreement that falls 
 
123. See William M. Corrigan & Michael B. Kass, Non-Compete Agreements and 
Unfair Competition—An Updated Overview, 62 J. MO. B. 81, 81 (2006). 
124. Michael Garrison & John Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete 
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 
112-13 (2008). 
125. Id. at 114. 
126. See, e.g., Allen, Gibbs, & Houlik, L.C. v. Ristow, 94 P.3d 724, 726 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2004) (citing Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84 (1996)). See also M. Scott McDonald, 
Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN 
L. REV. 137, 143 (2003). McDonald notes that among the recognized protectable interests 
for employers are: 
 
(1) to protect trade secrets and confidential information of the 
company; (2) to protect customer goodwill developed for the 
company (customer relationships); (3) to protect overall business 
goodwill and assets that have been sold (noncompetes used in the 
sale of a business); (4) to protect unique and specialized training; (5) 
for situations in which the employer has contracted for the services of 
an individual of unique value because of who they are (e.g., 
performers, professional athletes); and (6) for pinnacle employees in 
charge of an organization. 
 
McDonald, supra at 143 (internal citations omitted). 
127. McDonald, supra note 126, at 142. 
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somewhere between right and contract. The noncompete agreement 
resembles a contract—terms dictated by agreement, supported by 
consideration. But, in fact, the language of the noncompete agreement 
does not necessarily bind parties. Unless the agreement meets a standard 
of reasonableness, and is constrained in several important areas, courts 
will refuse to enforce this “contractual” agreement.128 The law restricts 
the scope of the noncompete agreement because society has decided that 
fundamental issues of fairness are at stake.
129
 Presumably, the limitations 
on the noncompete agreement are so important that they may only be 
waived under certain conditions. 
I believe that the reasonableness requirement for noncompete 
agreements is designed to balance the interests of all entities affected by 
the employer, the employee, and society as a whole. Each entity has an 
interest to be protected. The employee wishes to preserve his mobility; 
the employer wishes to protect itself from unfair competition; and society 
wishes to balance its interest in employed workers with a system that 
provides incentives for the development and training of employees. With 
such varied interests at hand, a noncompete agreement must be drafted in 
such a way as to satisfy all interested parties. 
To satisfy the reasonableness requirement, the law requires that the 
employer establish a reason for the noncompete agreement other than 
preventing the employee from competing with his former employer.
130
 
Moreover, establishing the existence of a legitimate business interest to 
be protected is merely the threshold step that an employer must meet to 
create an enforceable agreement.
131
 The scope of the noncompete 
agreement must not be greater than the business interest at stake.
132
 
Almost all courts apply a similar standard of reasonableness in deciding 
whether to enforce a noncompete agreement.
133
 
A noncompete agreement will be enforceable only “if the restraint 
imposed is not unreasonable, is founded on a valuable consideration, and 
 
128. Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements When 
Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 95 
(1998) (noting that "[m]ost courts will not enforce covenants unless their terms are 
reasonable."). See also T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment 
Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2005). 
129. See generally Anenson, supra note 128.  
130. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 124, at 115. 
131. See id. 
132. Id. at 118. 
133. Id. at 117-18. See also Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 
910-11 n.1 (W. Va. 1982). 
25
PIVATEAU_Formatted_Finalv3 4/11/2012  7:40 PM 
2012] PRIVATE RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC DISPUTES 139 
is reasonably necessary to protect the interest of the party in whose favor 
it is imposed, and does not unduly prejudice the interests of the 
public.”134 Many states follow the test set forth in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, which takes into consideration the following 
factors: (1) whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the 
business and goodwill of the employer; (2) whether the employer’s need 
for protection outweighs the economic hardship which the covenant 
imposes on the departing party; and (3) whether the restriction adversely 
affects the interests of the public.
135
 
Once a court determines that the noncompete agreement protects a 
legitimate business interest, it will then examine the agreement to ensure 
that it does not exceed the minimum restraint necessary to protect that 
interest.
136
 Courts will enforce agreements only where they are “strictly 
limited in time and territorial effect and. . . [are] otherwise reasonable 
considering the business interest of the employer sought to be protected 
and the effect on the employee.”137 To be enforceable, agreements must 
be reasonable in three ways: scope (referring to the subject matter of the 
agreement), duration, and geography.
138
 
 
D.  Arbitration Agreements Should Be Based on a Standard of 
Reasonableness 
 
The law restricts contractual freedom for noncompete agreements. 
Why does society tolerate this contractual restriction? It is likely because 
society recognizes the competing interests involved in a noncompete 
agreement and attempts to balance them using the reasonableness 
standard. In a similar vein, the law should recognize the competing 
interests in the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in the employment 
relationship. Because of the special nature of the employment 
 
134. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (Ga. 1992) (quoting 
Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 738 (Ga. 1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1981). 
136. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 124, at 117-18. 
137. Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting White v. Fletcher/Mayo/Assocs., 303 S.E.2d 746, 748 (Ga. 1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
138. See UARCO Inc. v. Lam, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Haw. 1998) (noting 
parameters of reasonableness inquiry). See also Pinnacle Performance, Inc. v. Hessing, 
17 P.3d 308, 311 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (explaining the three factors considered by that 
court in a reasonableness inquiry). 
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relationship, society should not permit unlimited contractual freedom in 
regard to mandatory arbitration. 
Currently, the law supports the use of mandatory arbitration 
agreements in the employment context. These agreements may 
encompass the resolution of disputes involving rights provided by 
external law. Following Rent-A-Center, the court system is unlikely to 
examine any allegations of unfairness regarding the arbitration process, 
in that the arbitration agreement assigns those allegations to the 
arbitrator. As a result, there is a risk that an employer could design an 
arbitration process so unfair that it amounts to denial of rights provided 
by statute. After Rent-A-Center, a federal court may, in most cases, no 
longer examine the arbitration process. Instead, it must only look to 
whether the arbitration agreement unfairly reserved allegations of 
unconscionability to the arbitrator. 
The judicial system has effectively removed itself from oversight of 
the arbitration process. This creates a risk of abuse of the arbitration 
process. The arbitration agreement must be constrained. It must, 
however, be constrained in a way that permits continued use of 
arbitration agreements, while at the same time limiting the possibility of 
abuse. Ideally, the measure of constraint would not involve lengthy, 
expensive, or confused oversight by the court system. 
The solution is the use of a bright line rule to constrain the 
arbitration agreement. Restraint could be accomplished by the use of a 
reasonableness standard. Under my proposal, courts should enforce 
mandatory arbitration clauses to the extent that the arbitration agreement 
is reasonable. Of course, “reasonableness” will require debate and 
forethought, but I would propose that the reasonableness standard should 
include the following aspects. 
 
1. The Arbitration Agreement Should Provide for 
Voluntariness 
 
Mandatory arbitration of statutory claims without voluntary consent 
is problematic. Courts have described voluntariness as the “bedrock 
justification” for the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements.139 
If future employment agreements contain clauses mandating arbitration 
of statutory actions, then there must be some means to ensure that the 
 
139. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs, Inc. 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 
2000). 
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employee knew the nature of the arbitration provision when he signed it. 
Therefore, the proposed reasonableness standard should provide some 
guarantee that the employee entered into the agreement voluntarily. 
Nevertheless, any rule that is not clear will invite litigation. Lack of 
a bright line test for determining voluntariness will create uncertainty. 
The voluntariness test could also create problems with uniform 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Employees who sign the same 
agreement may not be subject to the same enforcement. “Piecemeal 
application of a dispute resolution program could threaten to unravel the 
program for all other similarly situated employees.”140 
I propose that the arbitration agreement be contained in a separate 
agreement, or at a minimum, require a separate signature line. This idea 
of separateness would establish that the arbitration clause facing the 
employee differs from the normal terms and conditions found in an 
employment agreement. By separating the arbitration clause from the rest 
of the agreement, employees would receive notice that the arbitration 
agreement should be considered separately from the rest of the 
document. Agreement to the arbitration clause could potentially have far 
greater consequences than any other term contained in the agreement, 
and therefore it is reasonable to insist on separate treatment. A separate 
document or signature line would provide some objective indications that 
the arbitration agreement was entered into knowingly and on a voluntary 
basis. 
Alternatively, Congress could enact requirements of voluntariness 
using standards similar to those in the Older Workers Benefit Protection 
Act (OWBPA).
141
 Congress enacted the OWBPA to protect the rights 
and benefits of older workers.
142
 The OWBPA imposes strict 
requirements for waivers of ADEA rights and claims.
143
 Under the 
OWBPA, “[a]n employee ‘may not waive’ an ADEA claim unless the 
employer complies with the statute.”144 To this end, the OWBPA creates 
a series of prerequisites for ‘knowing and voluntary’ waivers. The 
OWBPA sets forth eight mandatory elements for a knowing and 
 
140. Estreicher, supra note 50, at 1359. 
141. See, e.g., Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) of 1990, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621, 623, 626, 630 (2006). 
142. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427 (1998). 
143. See § 626(f). See also Oubre, 522 U.S. at 427 (holding that the “OWBPA 
implements Congress’ policy via a strict, unqualified statutory stricture on waivers.”). 
144. Oubre, 522 U.S. at 427. 
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voluntary waiver of ADEA claims.
145
 
Creating an arbitration voluntariness standard similar to that in the 
OWBPA has several advantages. Signing such a waiver would focus an 
employee’s attention on the potential pitfalls involved in mandatory 
arbitration. An OWBPA-style waiver provides another benefit. 
Employers would appreciate the bright line requirements of 
voluntariness. Inclusion of the required elements would provide a safe 
harbor regarding the voluntariness of an employee’s agreement. An 
employer required to draft a waiver similar to that mandated by the 
OWBPA would ensure that its employees only entered into the 
agreement on a knowing and voluntary basis. 
 
2. The Arbitration Agreement Should Provide Guarantees of 
Due Process and Fairness 
 
It is well-established that the law does not require due process in 
private arbitration.
146
 Courts have routinely found that arbitration is a 
 
145. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006). Pursuant to the law, the requirements for a valid 
waiver require that: (1) the waiver must be written in plain English so that the employee 
can understand the agreement; (2) the waiver must specifically mention that the employee 
is giving up his or her claims under ADEA; (3) the waiver cannot waive rights that arise 
after the date the release is signed; (4) the employee must receive consideration of value 
above anything to which employee is already entitled; (5) the employee must be advised 
to consult with an attorney; (6) the employee must have at least twenty-one (21) days to 
consider agreement; and that (7) the employee must have seven (7) days to revoke their 
acceptance of the agreement. If, however, the termination is part of a reduction in 
workforce or voluntary program that affects two or more employees, employee must also 
be given at least forty-five days to consider the agreement and a “release attachment” that 
has a list of those selected for the program (or termination) and those who are not. See id. 
146. See Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185 
(2006); Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 
GA. L. REV. 1145, 1161 (2004) (noting that “[e]very federal court considering the 
question has concluded that there is no state action present in contractual arbitration.”). 
See also Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982)) (private actors must 
satisfy constitutional due process standards only if there is a “close nexus between the 
State and the challenged action” so that the “State is responsible for the specific conduct 
of which the plaintiff complains” or it “has exercised coercive power or has provided 
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be 
deemed to be that of the State” and that “[m]ere approval . . . is not sufficient to justify 
holding the State responsible for those initiatives.”); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., 
Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 369 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)) (concluding “that the arbitral forum adequately protects an 
employee's statutory rights, both substantively and procedurally,” as required by the Fifth 
Amendment's right to due process); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 
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private process, based on agreement of the parties, and thus lacks the 
requisite state action to raise due process constitutional concerns.
147
 
Despite the state’s review and enforcement of arbitral awards, courts 
have proved unwilling to find that this role would rise to the level of state 
action.
148
 Without the involvement of a state actor, the parties to an 
arbitration agreement may not demand constitutional protections.
149
 
Nevertheless, any proposed standard for reasonableness should 
include provisions for due process and fairness. When a state actor is 
involved, the Constitution guarantees due process.
150
 Where the law 
grants a right, included within that right is a remedy. A right without a 
remedy would render the underlying right meaningless. The law should 
provide the opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision maker. This 
process providing for notice and an opportunity to be heard should be as 
nonwaivable as the underlying right itself. Otherwise, it renders the 
underlying right meaningless. Forcing an employee into an unfair 
arbitration process for a statutory claim arguably deprives that employee 
of property without due process of law.
151
 
If we are to continue to consign employment disputes to mandatory 
arbitration, public policy demands that certain standards of fairness be 
met. If in fact we cannot rely on the Constitution to provide employees 
with sufficient protection, then it is the responsibility of Congress to act. 
It should be possible to provide standards sufficient to safeguard public 
policy, without converting the arbitration system into a court system. 
Fortunately, in determining what due process protections should be 
put in place, we can draw on previous attempts to create due process 
protocols for employment arbitration. Reliance on these pre-existing 
protocols will simplify the creation of due process standards. 
 
1182, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the requisite element of state action was 
lacking in arbitration because there was no state action when parties signed the arbitration 
agreement); Davis v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191-93 (11th Cir. 
1995) (stating that because “arbitration was a private proceeding arranged by a voluntary 
contractual agreement of the parties . . . . the arbitration proceeding itself did not 
constitute state action,” thus the “due process challenge to the arbitration . . . must fail.”); 
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding that a party's agreement to arbitration precludes argument that due process 
was denied). 
147. Buckner, supra note 146, at 214-15. 
148. Id. at 215. 
149. Id. at 216. 
150. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
151. Estlund, supra note 89, at 410. 
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Employment arbitration due process protocols resulted from private 
attempts to establish fairness in the employment arbitration context.
152
 
Responding to fears that the arbitration was unfair, and that the judicial 
system had abandoned its role in ensuring open access to justice, a group 
of dispute resolution organizations crafted due process protocols to 
govern the arbitration of employment disputes. 
The Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of 
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship 
(“Employment Protocol”) stresses “standards of exemplary due 
process.”153 The Employment Protocol lacks the force of law; 
nevertheless, many arbitration providers have voluntarily agreed to 
follow it.
154
 The Employment Protocol states that parties to an 
employment dispute utilizing arbitration “should have the right to be 
represented by a spokesperson of their own choosing,”155 should have 
“[a]dequate but limited pre-trial discovery,”156 and should have 
experienced, diverse, independent, neutral, and knowledgeable 
arbitrators.
157
 
Arbitration providers may thus ensure due process through adoption 
 
152. See A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory 
Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, ALLIANCE FOR EDUC. DISP. 
RESOL., http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/Guide/Due_process_protocol_empd 
ispute.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
153. Id. 
154. Richard Bales, Beyond the Protocol: Recent Trends in Employment 
Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 301, 302 (2007). Specifically, Bales states: 
  
The Employment Protocol has been extremely influential. It has 
been adopted by the major arbitration service providers, members of 
which will refuse to arbitrate cases under rules inconsistent with the 
Protocol. It has inspired two additional Protocols, both adopted in 
1998: the Due Process Protocol for Consumer Disputes (the 
Consumer Protocol) and the Health Care Due Process Protocol (the 
Health Care Protocol). The Employment Protocol has provided 
scrupulous employers with a model for drafting fair, ethical, and 
enforceable arbitration agreements. It has also guided courts in their 
decisions of whether to enforce particular employment arbitration 
agreements. The Employment Protocol remains the benchmark 
against which employment arbitration agreements are measured. 
 
Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
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and enforcement of the Employment Protocol, as well as by rejecting the 
arbitration of claims that do not meet the due process standards set forth 
in the Employment Protocol.
158
 Although the Employment Protocol may 
constitute a “bare minimum” of due process,159 it has “helped restore the 
public’s perception of arbitration, leading some to believe that all 
disputants are given a level playing field in the arbitral process.”160 
There have been judicial efforts as well to define the requirements 
of equitability in employment arbitration. In construing proper 
procedural protections, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that an arbitration agreement must: (1) 
provide for neutral arbitrators; (2) provide for more than minimal 
discovery; (3) require a written award; (4) provide for all of the types of 
relief that would otherwise be available in court; and (5) not “require 
employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or 
expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.”161 
To be reasonable under my proposal, an arbitration process must 
ensure due process. At a minimum, to be reasonable, due process should 
permit the employee to choose a representative. Due process guidelines 
should also provide for a proportionate sharing of costs, to ensure that 
employees are not effectively prohibited from having their dispute heard. 
Due process guidelines should provide some form of information 
sharing, thus requiring a cost effective discovery procedure. 
Arbitration qualification and selection is another potential topic area 
for the due process requirement. With quite complicated statutes 
involved, it will be important that the arbitration process provide for 
arbitrators who are skilled and knowledgeable. The means for selection 
of an arbitrator or panel will be an issue that should be included within 
 
158. See Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty 
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 165, 
174 (2005). The Due Process Protocol has been criticized too for its failure to provide 
guidance in a number of important areas. Areas to be improved include contract 
formation issues, barriers to access, process issues, remedies issues, FAA issues, and 
conflicts of interest. See id. at 167, 185. 
159. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment 
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1045 
(1996) (asserting that the protocol provides employees with “few, if any, significant 
process rights.”). 
160. Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. 
DISP. RESOL. 369, 372 (2004). 
161. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(emphasis in original). 
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the due process guidelines. 
Finally, the due process requirement should govern the arbitrator’s 
scope of authority. If the employment agreement provides for arbitration 
of statutory claims, the arbitrator must have the power to award statutory 
remedies. If we are to ensure that parties contracting to arbitration are not 
waiving substantive rights, then it is important to ensure that those 
parties retain the right to the same remedies as they would have in the 
statutory forum. 
 
3.  The Arbitration Agreement Should Provide for Openness 
 
The private resolution of public disputes raises many concerns. In 
its protocol describing the essence of a fair and enforceable arbitration 
agreement, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit proposed written decisions.
162
 My legislative proposal 
would do the same—require a written decision for any arbitral award. 
Without some standard of openness, citizens are unable to ensure that the 
public concerns are being met. Without some sort of public “scrutiny” 
the public has no knowledge of whether the private resolution systems 
are doing the same work as the courts. Was the procedure fair? Was the 
public interest “satisfied”?163 Those are important questions that cannot 
be answered without some sort of transparency built into the dispute 
resolution system. 
The public has an interest in seeing that its laws are enforced 
consistently and equitably. An arbitrator acts as both judge and jury, 
interpreting the law and deciding the facts. But an arbitrator has no 
public face; he is “neither publicly chosen nor publicly accountable.”164 
The common law system works in large part because it is designed 
to grow, to be flexible, and to adapt to a changing society. The gains 
made in addressing racial inequalities in the United States would likely 
be much less had the Title VII claims of the 1960s and 1970s been 
consigned to private resolution systems. And the common law can 
accomplish this weighty task in large part because published decisions 
filter throughout society. These decisions, even when not compelled by 
 
162. Id. 
163. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 
1089-90 (1984) (criticizing settlements instead of full adjudications, because they fail to 
fulfill the public law function). 
164. Edwards, supra note 8, at 297. 
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the power of precedent, have influence on other courts that face similar 
fact patterns. 
But a privatized legal system cannot provide the same atmosphere 
for growth and change. Virtually every decision rendered by an arbitrator 
is a walled garden, cut off from all but those parties involved in the 
decision. The American court system was not designed to function in this 
manner. Surely a system built on closed, opaque models cannot serve 
society as a whole. Diverting disputes from civil courts to arbitral forums 
could disrupt the development of legal doctrine.
165
 
One can understand objections to the requirement of openness. 
Mandatory publication of awards will certainly lead to an increase in 
costs, and it is the fear of costs that has largely driven the arbitration 
agenda. Mandatory publication would also diminish the privacy 
protections afforded by arbitration. Employees leery of public 
involvement could possibly fail to bring substantive claims for fear of 
having their identity published. Additionally, an argument exists that 
there will continue to be enough litigation to generate sufficient civil 
court opinions.
166
 
Nevertheless, I believe that the advantages of publication will 
outweigh the disadvantages. Although the court system may continue to 
produce sufficient legal doctrine, the evidence seems to indicate that we 
will see much less litigation than before. Moreover, if every arbitration 
panel issues a short opinion conveying its findings and publishing the 
award, costs should be minimal. Finally, drafters could engineer 
sufficient privacy protections into the system, similar to the means that 
courts currently address privacy concerns. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The growth of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment 
agreements threatens the protections provided by public law. The 
complexity of the employment relationship has led to much statutory 
control and oversight. Employment-related statutes, both federal and 
state, often provide a private right of action. Lawmakers knew that the 
 
165. Id. 
166. See Estreicher, supra note 50, at 1356. See also St. Antoine, supra note 100, at 
789 (opining that “[t]he notion that the use of arbitration will inhibit the development of a 
body of judicial doctrine on workplace discrimination seems highly suspect in light of the 
very large caseload of the federal courts in this area.”). 
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ability of an employee to sue his employer in court was vital to making 
the legislation work. Litigation of employment disputes, within the 
judicial system, not only resolved matters for the litigants, but provided 
guidance to thousands of other employers and employees. 
Employees have a right to the protection of public statutes. 
Mandatory arbitration puts those rights in jeopardy. Consigning 
important statutory claims to private arbitration carries huge risks. Title 
VII created an opportunity for millions to achieve economic integration 
to American society. It took a century for the promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—that all Americans are to be treated equally under the 
law—to become a reality. But in fact it was more than Title VII at 
work—the body of law generated by court cases brought pursuant to the 
statute played a key role in changing the world. It is a safe assumption 
that the United States would look much different today if all Title VII 
cases had been directed into private dispute resolution processes. 
Nevertheless, we also know that arbitration carries important 
advantages. It could provide a simpler and less expensive forum for the 
resolution of employment disputes. The challenge that society faces lies 
in balancing the protections of the law and the policies underlying those 
protections against the advantages of arbitration. To create that balance, I 
believe that a standard of reasonableness should be imposed on 
arbitration agreements. This standard of reasonableness will protect the 
interests of all parties: the employer, the employee, and society as a 
whole. 
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